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BOOK REVIEW
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. By the Council on
the Role of Courts* (J. Lieberman ed.). St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1984. Pp.
xiii, 171. $28.95.
Reviewed by Richard S. Arnold1
In recent years, the performance of American courts has been the sub-
ject of renewed debate. The Role of Courts in American Society is a wel-
come addition to this discourse on our system of justice. The book,
though short, is broad in scope, surveying scholarship and compilations
of data on a wide range of issues affecting our courts. It examines and
explains the content and size of, as well as the changes in, state and fed-
eral court dockets. It also explores competing views of what courts do
well and of what types of disputes are better resolved in other ways, and
assesses a number of proposals for improving the courts.
The chief achievement of the book is that it is an intelligent discussion
accessible not only to lawyers and scholars, but also to anyone interested
in the role of the courts. The authors are consistently careful to present
the legal and historical background necessary to an understanding of the
topics discussed. Even those already conversant with these issues are
likely to glean new information or ideas from The Role of Courts; it is
especially valuable for integrating so much into one coherent volume.
As The Role of Courts notes, current unrest over litigation in America
is not so much the result of the increased volume of litigation as of the
fact that courts today exercise jurisdiction over a wide range of cases that
some people think go far beyond the traditional role of judges. Many
cases require courts to resolve disputes for which there was formerly no
judicial redress. In addition, structural-reform litigation concerning
* The Council on the Role of Courts is a group of 29 distinguished lawyers, judges, and
professors assembled in 1978 by Daniel J. Meador, then Assistant Attorney General of the United
States in charge of the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ). The group
put together this book over a series of years. Maurice Rosenberg, Professor of Law, Columbia
University, and Frank E.A. Sander, Professor of Law, Harvard University, served as Chairmen of
the Council, and Professor Rosenberg also chaired the Report Committee. First OIAJ (1978-81)
and then the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) at New York University (since 1981) served
as the Council's secretariat. Jethro K. Lieberman was principal editor of the Final Report.
1. United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit. B.A. 1957, Yale, LL.B. 1960, Harvard.
Member of the Arkansas and District of Columbia Bars.
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schools, prisons, and other public institutions has led to remedies that
involve courts in administrative matters previously the sole province of
the executive and legislative branches of government. The authors of
The Role of Courts cite a number of social developments that lie behind
the increased "legalization" of disputes that other institutions once
would have resolved. Increased litigiousness is partially the result of the
social fragmentation and declining political cohesiveness of the past few
decades. Ironically, it can also be traced to the increased dependence of
individuals on government and other members of society for physical and
economic survival; recognizing that we are no longer (if ever we were) a
nation of self-reliant yeoman farmers, we have sought through a system
of legal entitlements to protect ourselves from the vargaries of life.
Again ironically, increased litigation is also a product of emerging agree-
ment on new principles and social norms, such as on civil-rights issues,
and, at least among those seeking relief, agreement on the distinctive
ability of courts to rectify matters. Courts and legislatures have re-
sponded to and reinforced these developments, expanding legal rights
and reducing institutional barriers to litigation.2
To assess the burdens placed on the courts as a consequence of these
changes and the way in which courts have adapted to them, the authors
of The Role of Courts extensively examine the available data on state and
federal court caseloads. Case volume has increased at all judicial levels
since 1950. State courts handle vastly more cases than federal courts.3
Yet, the data on the work state courts do are particularly sketchy. Be-
cause state courts obviously play a pivotal role in our legal system, per-
haps the pivotal role, we must take to heart the authors' repeated
recommendations that greater resources be committed to collecting and
standardizing the state-court data, so that a more accurate analysis of
their operations and problems will be possible.
Other points of interest The Role of Courts' survey of caseload data
brings out include the following: State courts of limited jurisdiction,
such as family and probate courts, handle more civil and more criminal
cases than state courts of general jurisdiction. Less than two percent of
cases fied in state courts are tried, while about six percent of federal
2. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
3. The authors state that in 1976, state-court filings numbered between 70 and 108 million.
THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 29 (J.
Lieberman ed. 1984). 1982 federal district court filings numbered less than 250,000. Id. at 33.
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cases reach trial; apparently there has been little change in recent years in
the percentage of cases filed that reach adjudication. The time that a case
takes to reach adjudication depends largely upon its subject matter.
Thus, state general-jurisdiction courts, which generally hear more com-
plex and actively litigated cases than do limited-jurisdiction courts, typi-
cally suffer greater delays despite the fact that limited-jurisdiction courts
generally handle a much higher number of cases. Federal district court
cases tend to reach resolution more quickly than state cases. Finally, on
the question of litigation costs, The Role of Courts cites a recent study
suggesting that the popular perception that the average court case is
complex and costly is not entirely accurate.4
The authors identify a number of significant changes and trends in
litigation. Per capita use of federal courts has more than quadrupled
since 1900, and state-court figures also indicate a rise in per capita usage.
The number of appeals in federal courts and state intermediate appellate
courts has increased sharply, outstripping the growth in case filings. The
percentages of family cases, tort cases, and cases to which the govern-
ment is a party, particularly civil-rights cases, have all increased, while
the percentage of commercial disputes has declined. Litigants make
more extensive and more frequent demands on the equitable powers of
the courts. Important in this regard is the addition of institutional-re-
form litigation to court dockets, litigation whose significance is belied by
the relatively small number of cases involved. The authors maintain that
such cases have helped induce greater judicial attention to the rights of
"the citizenry at large," a departure from the traditional adversarial
process.
The Role of Courts notes several kinds of responses that have been
made to the growing workload of the courts. Efforts to enlarge judicial
resources have been impeded by a lack of money; this has been a greater
problem for state courts than for federal courts because Congress has
significantly increased federal-court funding in recent years. Courts have
also engaged in more active management of cases by, for example, re-
stricting discovery or encouraging settlement. Another approach has
been to restructure the judicial machinery, principally through creation
of specialized tribunals to handle some kinds of high-volume litigation.
Turning from an examination of what types of cases courts are han-
4. Id. at 60-61, citing Trubek, Studying Courts in Context, 15 L. & Soc'Y REv. 485 (1981);
Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv.
72 (1983).
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dling, The Role of Courts takes up the more theoretical question of what
types of cases the courts should handle. To illustrate conflicting posi-
tions on what functions courts effectively and legitimately perform, the
authors present two views of court competence, that of the "traditional-
ist" and that of the "adaptationist." The authors make clear that these
labels do not refer to well-defined schools of thought, but merely describe
views abroad in the land to which no given individual's views or practices
are likely to correspond in every particular; the authors generally restrict
themselves to describing, without endorsing, these points of view.
The "traditionalist" view emphasizes the distinct role of courts in our
governmental system as adjudicators. Only court functions that fall
within traditional notions of the adversary process are appropriate. For
the traditionalist, the role of the judge is that of a passive umpire whose
duty is to ensure observance of the formal norms of the adversary pro-
cess. To venture beyond these boundaries, the traditionalist maintains,
undermines the legitimacy of a court's actions.
The "adaptationist," on the other hand, stresses the ability of courts to
adopt varying forms and procedures and to provide flexible equitable
remedies. According to adaptationists, courts may legitimately resolve
any dispute presented to them if they can do so in a manner that is effi-
cient, effective, and consistent with due process. Adaptationists assert
that the traditionalists underestimate or ignore the problem of powerless
parties who may lack the clout to obtain relief through the political
branches and who may be unrepresented or poorly represented in the
courts. They argue that judges must play an active part in overcoming
this problem by, among other things, encouraging participation, closely
scrutinizing pro se and uncontested petitions, and reaching out for infor-
mation on the potential effects of decisions on absent parties. The
adaptationists further argue that courts, in order to arrive at better reso-
lutions in cases such as those involving ongoing relations or extended
impact on nonparties, should borrow from other techniques, such as me-
diation, negotiation, and administration. Traditionalists and adaptation-
ists have their most heated exchanges over two points: the remedial
powers of the courts in extended-impact cases, and the degree to which
departure from the adversarial process is permissible.
The authors identify a number of criteria relevant to determining what
types of cases are appropriate for courts, such as whether resolution of
the dispute requires the detached objectivity of a court, and whether, for
monetary claims, the amount at stake makes the cost of judicial resolu-
[Vol. 64:279
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tion prohibitive. Traditionalists and adaptationists differ in their applica-
tion of some criteria. For example, one factor to which traditionalists
accord greater weight is whether the dispute primarily involves determin-
ing past events rather than predicting or planning future events. Tradi-
tionalists feel that forecasting future behavior and designing future
courses of conduct are tasks better performed by legislative or adminis-
trative bodies. Other criteria include: whether there are authoritative,
ascertainable standards for a court to apply; whether the cases present
only repetitive, routine factual or administrative issues that do not re-
quire the particularized consideration associated with courts; whether
sounder resolution could be achieved through effectuating party prefer-
ences rather than imposing a third party's judgment; whether judicial
resolution would threaten the vitality of another institution; whether the
dispute arises in a specialized area and an immediate, final decision is
necessary; and whether the court, if not itself the best institution to make
a decision, may be helpful in determining by whom and how a decision is
to be made. In articulating these criteria, the authors draw heavily on
the work of Professor Lon Fuller and others discussing the characteris-
tics of courts and adjudication.5
The authors attempt to apply these criteria to the universe of cases
that might be submitted to a court, dividing the cases into five categories.
The first category of cases, those that everyone agrees belong in court,
includes constitutional claims involving life, death, or serious liberty or
property interests, and disputes between sharply contesting parties as-
serting legal claims rooted in past events. Second are cases that,
although suitable for courts, should be heard elsewhere, including cases
involving small monetary claims that should be handled through less ex-
pensive procedures, and cases, such as estate administration, that do not
generally require the particularized consideration characteristic of
courts. Third, in the category of cases in which the court should play a
"backup" role, the authors include three sorts of cases: child-custody
cases (in which the court should, if possible, "guide" the parties to a
negotiated settlement); other cases suitable for diversion to arbitration,
mediation, or negotiation prior to court consideration; and cases in
which courts, while leaving substantive decisions to another institution,
prescribe the decision-making procedures that the other institution must
follow. The fourth category is that of structural-reform cases, which
5. See, e.g., Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978).
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adaptationists believe belong in the courts but traditionalists generally
believe do not, at least when the question of remedy is reached. Finally,
there are cases generally agreed not to belong in court, such as "political
questions" and questions involving matters of internal church
governance.
The Role of Courts employs the distinction between traditionalists and
adaptationists to highlight and explain current disputes about what role
courts should play and how they should function. However, it also ob-
scures important disputes that do not fit a traditionalist/adaptationist di-
chotomy. For example, the adaptationists' concern over some parties'
lack of power, which prompts their criticism of strict adherence to the
adversarial process on inadequate representation grounds and their de-
mand that politically powerless parties be able to obtain institutional re-
form through the courts that they cannot obtain through the political
branches, may come into conflict with adaptationist support for the use
of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms. Professor Owen Fiss ar-
gues compellingly against court-fostered alternative dispute resolution on
grounds that illustrate this conflict between adaptationist values.6 Pro-
fessor Fiss contends that settlement prevents judges from compensating
for power imbalances among parties; that when groups rather than indi-
viduals are involved, obtaining authoritative consent to the settlement is
problematic; that when injunctions are part of the remedy, settlement
provides an inadequate basis for continuing judicial involvement; and
that, in sum, settlement promotes peace rather than justice. All too
often, so-called alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms produce at
best a kind of second-class, rough justice that is more rough than just.
The Role of Courts is not entirely unmindful of these concerns, 7 but they
are never brought to the fore of the discussion. Still, the book does man-
age to present a clear exposition of other areas of debate, and to have
attempted more might have compromised its usefulness as an introduc-
tion to and overview of these matters.
Finally, The Role of Courts considers several proposals for strengthen-
ing the capacity of courts to handle the cases that, whatever may be
6. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
7. For example, the authors cite with seeming approval the decision by a growing number of
mediators not to be a party to one-sided agreements that result from one party's ignorance or
powerlessness. THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 4, at 96. They also characterize heavy-handed
judicial use of mandatory settlement conferences as "an abuse of official power," id. at 58, to which I
add a fervent "Amen."
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proper theoretically, are in fact finding their way into the courts. In eval-
uating specialized courts, the authors note that opinions differ as to
whether specialization promotes valuable expertise, or instead fosters un-
desirable judicial narrowness; they conclude that even if an exclusive spe-
cialized court is rejected, a specialist option, like the United States Tax
Court, may nonetheless be desirable. Regarding "judicial adjuncts,"
such as referees and magistrates, they conclude that too little is known
about their impact on adjudication, and that more study is necessary.
Other suggestions the authors make are that judges should be en-
couraged to use pretrial conferences and other devices to curb expensive
and excessive discovery and other pretrial procedures, that further atten-
tion should be devoted to the possible use of alternative dispute-resolu-
tion methods, and that the technological and administrative personnel
resources of the courts should be expanded. This is by no means the
most ambitious set of recommendations one could envision, but ambi-
tious proposals should not be expected from a committee whose members
represent a variety of views and which aims at presenting a more or less
neutral discussion of the issues involved. More importantly, The Role of
Courts does provide a set of proposals that can be a starting place for
efforts to improve the performance of our courts.
The Role of Courts will be useful chiefly as a sort of primer of issues for
nonspecialists, including nonlawyers, who must address court-related
questions. A new member of a legislature, for example, would greatly
profit from referring to the book for information or from studying, from
time to time, specific parts of it. For that, the legal profession and the
public must be in the authors' debt.
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